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BAD SAMARITANISM AND
THE DUTY TO RENDER AID:
A PROPOSAL
Bad Samaritanism' is an age-old problem that never seems to
subside. Each year we hear of new variations on a recurring
theme: people witness their fellow citizens in serious danger, but
refuse to help.2 Some cases of Bad Samaritanism, such as the
Kitty Genovese murder3 and the New Bedford, Massachusetts
pool table rape,4 have achieved significant notoriety. Many other
The author wishes to thank Stephen Barker and William Pierce for their helpful criti-
cisms of earlier versions of the model statute presented in this Note.
1. The term derives its meaning from the Biblical parable of the Good Samaritan.
See Luke 10:25-37. Professor Feinberg defines the "Bad Samaritan" as:
1. a stranger standing in no "special relationship" to the endangered party
2. who omits to do something-warn of unperceived peril, undertake rescue,
seek aid, notify police, protect against further injury, etc.-for the endangered
party,
3. which he could have done without unreasonable cost or risk to himself or
others,
4. as a result of which the other party suffers harm, or an increased degree of
harm,
5. and for these reasons the omitter is "bad" (morally blameworthy).
J. FEINBERG, HARM TO OTHERS 126 (1984).
2. A typical example of such behavior occurred in August of 1984 in the village of
Pinckney, Michigan. A group of young people at a party witnessed two young men sav-
agely beat and kick fifty-seven-year-old Arthur Dining and stuff him in the trunk of his
car. The two attackers-with several of the partygoers still present-then took Dining's
car for a joy ride, stopping twice to beat Dining further, in spite of his pleas for mercy.
Finally, after returning to the party for a while with Dining still in the trunk, the two
attackers drove to a deserted area, dumped Dining on the side of the road, and burned
his car. Dining's body remained undiscovered for several days. "If any one of them had
picked up a phone," said Pinckney Police Chief William Smith, "that man might be alive
today. But it was the same old thing about not wanting to be involved, not caring enough
to call. And as a result, we've got a murder case." Ann Arbor News, Aug. 21, 1984, at Al.
3. In this infamous case, a knife-wielding assailant attacked a young woman named
Kitty Genovese three separate times over a period of thirty-five minutes on her own
residential street. Thirty-eight of Genovese's neighbors witnessed the attacks, but no one
helped her or even called the police. Only after the victim's death did one witness bother
to summon the police, who arrived on the scene within two minutes of the call. N.Y.
Times, Mar. 27, 1964, at Al.
4. Attackers repeatedly raped a woman on the pool table of a local tavern in New
Bedford, Massachusetts, while fifteen patrons watched. Not one of these witnesses sum-
moned the police during the entire seventy-five minute episode, and some, in fact,
cheered the rapists on, encouraging them to continue. NEWSWEEK, Mar. 21, 1983, at 25;
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cases of this sort, however, go relatively unnoticed.5
As a general rule, the law in this country, unlike the law in
many other countries," has never prohibited Bad Samaritanism. 7
Legal commentators, however, have long criticized this aspect of
the law and have advocated countering Bad Samaritanism by
enacting a generalized duty to rescue.8 Two states, Vermont9
Kiesel, Who Saw This Happen?, 69 A.B.A. J. 1208 (1983).
5. The author has discovered a number "of cases like this that have been reported in
the last two years alone (1983-84); it is likely that others have occurred as well. In one
reported incident, several youths in Manhattan attacked a couple on a subway in front of
fifty passive bystanders; they attempted to rob the couple and then stabbed the woman
in the eye. Ann Arbor News, Mar. 13, 1984, at Cl. In another incident, someone stabbed
a woman to death on a busy street in Virginia as twenty people looked on. Id. In St.
Louis, thirty people stood by and made no effort to help or summon the police as two
youths sexually assaulted a fourteen-year-old girl. Id. In San Antonio, two bystanders
ignored the cries of a man who fell off a ledge into nine feet of water. After saying some-
thing to him, they walked away and let him drown. Kiesel, supra note 4, at 1209. In
Baltimore, someone beat, robbed and stripped a female security guard in the lobby of an
apartment building, then wrapped a blanket around her head and set it on fire. Several
people in the building heard her screams, but no one investigated or called the police.
Hopkins News Letter, Nov. 16, 1984, at 1. In San Francisco, someone kidnapped a man
from his car in front of a group of onlookers, none of whom bothered to call the police.
U.S. NEWS AND WORLD REPORT, Nov. 14, 1983, at 56. In Colorado, the chief of police of a
small town lay on the side of a road crying for help after a rattlesnake bit him. None of
the fifty motorists who passed by helped him or even called for assistance. Id. In Califor-
nia, a young woman was beaten to death on Christmas day in her apartment. Her neigh.
bors ignored her cries for help for twenty-five minutes and only afterward called the
police, who arrived on the scene within five minutes of the call. Grand Rapids Press, Dec.
27, 1984, at A3.
For a discussion of some of the "classic" cases of Bad Samaritanism, see W. PROSSER,
LAW OF TORTS 340-43 (4th ed. 1971).
On a more positive note, people often perform acts of Good Samaritanism as well. One
of the more noteworthy incidents occurred recently in Detroit. Collin Boatright, a four-
foot nine-inch fourteen-year-old boy, spotted a six-foot two-inch man preparing to rape a
young girl. After instructing a neighbor to call the police, young Boatright picked up a
large stick, ran across the street to the house in which the attacker had dragged the girl,
and confronted him. "I was scared," said Boatright, "really scared. I felt like an ant
looking up at a giant, but I couldn't let him get away with attacking that little girl. So I
drawed back my stick and told him to stop. I was ready to hit him like he was a baseball
and I was trying to hit a home run." The police arrived shortly thereafter and arrested
the would-be rapist. Detroit Free Press, Feb. 26, 1985, at A3.
6. At least twenty-one countries have passed laws prohibiting Bad Samaritanism, in-
cluding France, Italy, and Germany. See Feldbrugge, Good and Bad Samaritans, 14 AM.
J. CoMP. L. 630, 655-57 (1966); Rudzinski, The Duty to Rescue: A Comparative Analysis,
in THE GOOD SAMARITAN AND THE LAW 91 (J. Ratcliffe ed. 1966).
7. See generally W. PROSSHE, supra note 5, at 338-50; W. LAFAVE & A. SCOTT, CRIMI-
NAL LAW 182-91 (1972). For a discussion of the exceptions to this rule, see infra notes 29-
44 and accompanying text.
8. See, e.g., B. CARDOZO, THE PARADOXES OF LEGAL SCIENCE 25-26; J. FEINBERG, supra
note 1, at 126-86; Ames, Law and Morality, 22 HARv. L. REv. 97 (1908); Benditt, Liabil-
ity for Failing to Rescue, 1 LAW & PHIL. 391 (1982); D'Amato, The "Bad Samaritan"
Paradigm, 70 Nw. U.L. REv. 798 (1975); Feldbrugge, supra note 6; Honor6, Law, Morals
and Rescue, in THE GOOD SAMARITAN AND THE LAW, supra note 6, at 225; Hughes, Crimi-
nal Omissions, 67 YALE L.J. 590 (1958); Kleinig, Good Samaritanism, 5 PHIL. & PUB. AFF.
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and Minnesota,1" have adopted such laws, thereby making it a
misdemeanor for people who witness others in serious danger
not to render reasonable assistance, provided they can do so
without endangering themselves. Two other states, Rhode Is-
land1" and Massachusetts,12 have taken a similar but more con-
382 (1976); Linden, Rescuers and Good Samaritans, 34 MOD. L. REV. 241 (1971); Ru-
dolph, The Duty to Act: A Proposed Rule, 44 NRS. L. REV. 499 (1965); Rudzinski, supra
note 6; Weinrib, The Case for a Duty to Rescue, 90 YALE L.J. 247 (1980); Woozley, A
Duty to Rescue: Some Thoughts on Criminal Liability, 69 VA. L. REv. 1273 (1983).
9. 12 VT. STAT. ANN. § 519 (1973):
(a) A person who knows that another is exposed to grave physical harm shall, to
the extent that the same can be rendered without danger or peril to himself or
without interference with important duties owed to others, give reasonable assis-
tance to the exposed person unless that assistance or care is being provided by
others.
(b) A person who provides reasonable assistance in compliance with subsection
(a) of this section shall not be liable in civil damages unless his acts constitute
gross negligence or unless he will receive or expects to receive remuneration.
Nothing contained in this subsection shall alter existing law with respect to tort
liability of a practitioner of the healing arts for acts committed in the ordinary
course of his practice.
(c) A person who willfully violates subsection (a) of this section shall be fined
not more than $100.00.
10. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 604.05 (1984):
1. Duty to assist. Any person at the scene of an emergency who knows that
another person is exposed to or has suffered grave physical harm shall, to the
extent that he can do so without danger or peril to himself or others, give rea-
sonable assistance to the exposed person. Reasonable assistance may include ob-
taining or attempting to obtain aid from law enforcement or medical personnel.
Any person who violates this section is guilty of a petty misdemeanor.
2. General immunity from liability. Any person who, without compensation or
the expectation of compensation renders emergency care, advice, or assistance at
the scene of an emergency or during transit to a location where professional
medical care can be rendered, is not liable for any civil damages as a result of
acts or omissions by that person in rendering the emergency care, advice, or as-
sistance unless that person acts in a willful and wanton or reckless manner in
providing the care, advice, or assistance. Any person rendering emergency care,
advice, or assistance during the course of regular employment, and receiving
compensation or expecting to receive compensation for rendering such care, shall
be excluded from the protection of this section.
For the purposes of this section, the scene of an emergency shall be those
areas not within the confines of a hospital or other institution which has hospital
facilities, or an office of a person licensed to practice one or more of the healing
arts. ....
For the purposes of this section, compensation does not include nominal pay-
ments, reimbursement for expenses, or pension benefits.
11. R.I. GEN. LAWS §11-37-3.1 to §11-37-3.4 (1983):
11-37-3.1. DUTY TO REPORT SEXUAL ASSAULT. -Any person, other than the victim,
who knows or had reason to know that a first degree sexual assault or attempted
first degree sexual assault is taking place in his/her presence shall immediately
notify the state police or the police department of the city or town in which said
assault or attempted assault is taking place of said crime.
11-37-3.2. NECESSITY OF COMPLAINT FROM VICTIM. -No person shall be charged
under 11-37-3.1 unless and until the police department investigating the inci-
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servative approach to Bad Samaritanism, requiring those who
witness certain violent crimes to notify the police.
In general, these four statutes appear to be a step in the right
direction. They are not, however, free from problems. On the
one hand, the Vermont and Minnesota duty-to-rescue statutes
are burdensome insofar as they may require witnesses to get per-
sonally involved in rescue attempts. The Rhode Island and Mas-
sachusetts duty-to-notify statutes, on the other hand, impose a
more reasonable duty but restrict its scope too much. The duty
to notify arises in these states only when people witness certain
specific crimes.13 This Note argues that states should follow
dent obtains from the victim a signed complaint against said person alleging a
violation of 11-37-3.1.
11-37-3.3. FAILURE TO REPORT-PENALTY. -Any person who knowingly fails to
report a sexual assault or attempted sexual assault as required under 11-37-3.1
shall be guilty of a misdemeanor and upon conviction thereof shall be punished
by imprisonment for not more than one year or fined not more than five hun-
dred dollars ($500) or both.
11-37-3.4. IMMUNITY FROM LIABILITY. - Any person participating in good faith in
making a report pursuant to § 11-37-3.1 shall have immunity from any liability,
civil or criminal, that might otherwise be incurred or imposed. Any such partici-
pant shall have the same immunity with respect to participation in any judicial
proceeding resulting from such report.
12. MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 268, § 40 (Michie/Law Co-op. Supp. 1985):
40. FAILURE OF WITNESS To REPORT AGGRAVATED RAPE, RAPE, MURDER, MAN-
SLAUGHTER, OR ARMED ROBBERY; PENALTY.
Whoever knows that another person is a victim of aggravated rape, rape, mur-
der, manslaughter or armed robbery and is at the scene of said crime shall, to
the extent that said person can do so without danger or peril to himself or
others, report said crime to an appropriate law enforcement official as soon as
reasonably practicable. Any person who violates this section shall be punished
by a fine of not less than five hundred nor more than two thousand and five
hundred dollars.
13. The Rhode Island statute is especially puzzling. It imposes the duty only when
the witness observes an actual or attempted first-degree sexual assault. See supra note
11. Why such a duty should apply when someone witnesses a rape but not, for example,
a murder, is difficult to understand.
Both statutes, moreover, encounter potentially serious problems insofar as they predi-
cate liability on the witness's having known or having had reason to know that she was
witnessing a particular type of crime. See Kiesel, supra note 4, at 1208. The Rhode Is-
land statute imposes liability only if the witness knew or had reason to know that she
was witnessing a first-degree sexual assault. See supra note 11. Similarly, the Massachu-
setts statute imposes liability only if the witness knew that she was witnessing an aggra-
vated rape, rape, murder, manslaughter, or armed robbery. See supra note 12. Predi-
cating liability in this manner raises the following problems for both statutes, although
these problems are particularly acute for the Massachusetts statute because it requires
actual knowledge.
First, the imposition of liability seems to require the witness to have known (or in the
case of the Rhode Island statute, to have had reason to know) the elements of the crime
she witnessed in order to be convicted for failing to notify. This would put an enormous
burden on the prosecution because most defendants could no doubt truthfully claim that
they did not know, and could not have been expected to know, that what they were
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Rhode Island and Massachusetts in enacting the duty to notify
rather than the duty to rescue, but it also proposes that states
generalize this approach so that the duty arises in all types of
cases in which people witness others in serious danger. Part I of
this Note explains the history of the law's response to Bad
Samaritanism. Part II discusses the benefits of enacting a duty
to notify. Part III responds to various objections that might be
raised against the duty to notify. And Part IV offers a model
statute for legislatures to follow in enacting the duty to notify.
I. BACKGROUND
This section discusses briefly the early common law's laissez-
faire attitude, toward Bad Samaritanism. It then considers the
various exceptions to this position which have arisen during the
last one hundred or so years in response to its apparent
harshness.
A. Historical Development
The early common law imposed no general duty to rescue or
notify.1 4 In fact, it specified very few situations in which one per-
witnessing was, for example, a first-degree sexual assault rather than a second-degree
sexual assault.
Second, even if a witness had the capacity to have had such knowledge (e.g., the wit-
ness was a criminal defense attorney), imposing liability in this manner would appar-
ently make it impossible for the state to convict the witness for failing to notify unless
the attacker was ultimately convicted of one of the specific crimes listed. For example, if
the attacker accepted a plea bargain and plead guilty to second-degree sexual assault, it
would be extremely difficult to prove that the witness knew or should have known that
she was witnessing a first-degree sexual assault, when it was never established by the
court that the attacker in fact committed such an assault.
This then raises a third problem: because the witness apparently cannot be convicted
for failing to notify until the attacker is convicted of one of the specific crimes listed, the
state will often be unable to try, or at least convict, the witness until the attacker has
been through a lengthy trial, and perhaps an appeal. Such a delay may well violate the
witness's constitutional right to a speedy trial. U.S. CONsT. amend. VI.
The Model Statute this Note proposes avoids the problems of the Rhode Island and
Massachusetts statutes by predicating the duty to notify on the purely factual question
of whether the witness knew or had reason to know that the victim was in serious physi-
cal danger. See infra Part IV, Model Statute. This means that the witness can be con-
victed whether or not she knew the elements of any crime, and whether or not the at-
tacker is ultimately convicted. All the trier of fact has to do is determine whether a
reasonable person would have known that the victim was in serious physical danger.
14. See Frankel, Criminal Omissions: A Legal Microcosm, 11 WAvwz L. Rav. 367,
367-84 (1965); Hughes, supra note 8, at 590-97. See also Glazebrook, Criminal Omis-
Journal of Law Reform
son had a legal obligation to do something for another.' 5 Over
the years, courts and legislatures began to formulate certain ex-
ceptions to the no-duty-to-rescue rule.16 These exceptions, how-
ever, developed slowly, so that even as late as a century ago, En-
glish courts generally acquitted mothers who let their children
die of starvation rather than seek public assistance.'
7
The reasons for this seemingly callous legal stance are not en-
tirely clear. Most commentators mention that the King's Court
needed to allocate its limited resources to stopping violent
crimes, and could not be troubled with "mere" omissions.' 8 As
Professor Frankel notes, the "rough and ready criminal law of
the garrison society could not spare the manpower in a world of
rogues, robbers, and felons, a world of hot blood and quick
death, to punish the subtler harms arising by omission. '
Another likely factor seems to have been society's emphasis on
individualism and self-reliance.2 0 An "invisible hand" mentality
prevailed, and people believed that a struggle among selfish indi-
viduals would automatically maximize the common good.2 Ju-
rists of the day may have felt that enacting positive duties2 2 like
a duty to rescue would undermine individualism and self-reli-
ance and lead to a society based on weakness.
Another reason for the common law's reluctance to enact a
duty to rescue may have been the failure of omissions to evoke
fear in people.23 Violent crimes scare people: individuals tend to
think that they could be the next victims. Acts of omission, on
the other hand, such as failing to help someone bleeding to
death on the side of the road, may make people indignant, but
they do not provoke the instinct of self-preservation that makes
individuals see the perpetrator as a potential danger to them-
selves or society. 4
sions: The Duty Requirement in Offenses against the Person, 76 L.Q. REv. 386 (1960)
(discussing the historical development of criminal omissions generally).
15. See Frankel, supra note 14, at 367-84; Hughes, supra note 8, at 590-97.
16. See Hughes, supra note 8, at 595-97.
17. See Kirchheimer, Criminal Omissions, 55 HARV. L. REv. 615, 622 (1942).
18. See Frankel, supra note 14, at 371-72; Linden, supra note 8, at 242; W. PROSSER,
supra note 5, at 338.
19. Frankel, supra note 14, at 371.
20. See W. PROSSER, supra note 5, at 339; Note, The Failure to Rescue: A Compara-
tive Study, 52 COLUM. L. REV. 631, 632 (1952); Linden, supra note 8, at 242.
21. Rudzinski, supra note 6, at 120; Hale, Prima Facie Torts, Combination, and
Non-feasance, 46 COLUM. L. REv. 196, 214 (1946).
22. A "positive duty" means a duty that requires affirmative action; it is contrasted
with a "negative duty," which prohibits certain action.
23. See Frankel, supra note 14, at 375-76.
24. As Professor Frankel puts it:
[VOL. 19:1
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Finally, theoretical considerations may have contributed to
the early common law's reluctance to impose a duty to rescue.
The seemingly tenuous causal connection between omissions and
harm, for example, apparently troubled some jurists.2 ' Likewise,
the courts may have felt that positive duties like the duty to
rescue imposed too great a burden on individual liberty to jus-
tify any benefits that might result from their enactment.
26
Whatever the reasons, the no-duty-to-rescue rule became em-
bedded in the law through the effect of stare decisis This rule
remains the law today,28 though courts and legislatures have, es-
pecially during the last one hundred years or so, carved out cer-
tain exceptions to it in response to its apparent harshness.
B. Current Exceptions
With the exception of Vermont, Minnesota, Rhode Island and
Massachusetts, 29 the law in the United States imposes a duty to
[I]n most omission situations there was, and still is, the absence of elements
inspiring that fear which is the moving emhotional force for so much of the legis-
lated counter-terror of penal sanction. Indeed, terror is the very marrow of the
criminal law . . . . [Ilt is this inability of most omission situations to arouse
more than a feeling of distaste and displeasure toward the omitter which helps
to account for the failure of the law to inculpate all harmful omissions.
Id.
25. Id. at 375. See also Kirchheimer, supra note 17, at 616-17.
26. See Hale, supra note 21, at 214; Linden, supra note 8, at 242.
27. See Note, supra note 20, at 631; Honor6, supra note 8, at 241.
28. As Prosser notes:
[Tihe law has persistently refused to recognize the moral obligation of common
decency and common humanity, to come to the aid of another human being who
is in danger, even though the outcome is to cost him his life. Some of the deci-
sions have been shocking in the extreme. The expert swimmer, with a boat and a
rope at hand, who sees another drowning before his eyes, is not required to do
anything at all about it, but may sit on the dock, smoke his cigarette, and watch
the man drown. A physician is under no duty to answer the call of one who is
dying and might be saved, nor is anyone required to play the part of Florence
Nightingale and bind up the wounds of a stranger who is bleeding to death, or to
prevent a neighbor's child from hammering on a dangerous explosive, or to re-
move a stone from the highway where it is a menace to traffic, or a train from a
place where it blocks a fire engine on its way to save a house, or even to cry a
warning to one who is walking into the jaws of a dangerous machine. The rem-
edy in such cases is left to the "higher law" and the "voice of conscience," which,
in a wicked world, would seem to be singularly ineffective either to prevent the
harm or to compensate the victim.
W. PRossER, supra note 5, at 340-41. See also supra note 7.
29. See supra notes 9-12. In addition, 46 U.S.C. § 728 (1982) requires the captain of a
sea vessel to render aid to anyone found at sea in danger of being lost. Failure to do so
can result in a $1000 fine and/or two years imprisonment.
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rescue or render aid only in certain situations."0 For con-
venience's sake, these situations can be grouped into five roughly
distinct categories. First, courts have imposed a duty to render
aid upon parties who share special relationships. These include
relationships of intimacy and relationships in which the party
upon whom the duty is imposed gains economic benefits from
the association. Parents, for example, have a duty to care for
their children,31 innkeepers have a duty to protect their guests, 2
and employers have a duty to watch out for their employees.
33
Second, courts have recognized that individuals bound by cer-
tain contractual agreements have a duty to render aid. A rail-
road gateman, for example, has an obligation to lower his gate
when necessary and will be held liable for any injuries to passen-
gers that result if he fails to do so.Y4 Likewise, a lifeguard who
sits idly by and watches a swimmer drown may be liable for the
swimmer's death. 5 Thus, courts impose a duty to render aid
upon those whose job it is to help others.
Third, courts have imposed a duty to rescue upon those who
put others in danger through ordinary negligence. Thus, a golfer
who negligently endangers another golfer by an errant shot has a
duty to that golfer." Likewise, a person who accidentally starts a
fire in a building has a duty to provide reasonable assistance to
another person trapped inside. 7
Fourth, a person who begins to render assistance to another
has a duty to provide continued assistance if the rescuer's termi-
nating the rescue attempt would put the victim in a worse posi-
tion than he was in prior to the rescue attempt. The rescuer
must not abandon the victim, in other words, unless the rescuer
leaves the victim in at least as good a position as the victim was
in prior to the attempted rescue. If, for example, someone volun-
teers to care for an infant, then fails to do so adequately and the
child dies, that person will be liable for the child's death.38 The
rationale for this rule is that a potential rescuer's aborted rescue
attempt discourages others from helping who could otherwise
save the victim.
30. See generally W. PRossER, supra note 5, at 338-50; W. LAMvE & A. ScorT, supra
note 7, at 182-91. See also Jones v. United States, 308 F.2d 307, 310 (D.C. Cir. 1962).
31. See, e.g., Palmer v. State, 223 Md. 341, 164 A.2d 467 (1960).
32. See, e.g., Dove v. Lowden, 47 F. Supp. 546 (W.D. Mo. 1942).
33. See, e.g., Anderson v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 333 U.S. 821 (1948).
34. See, e.g., State v. Benton, 38 Del. 1, 187 A. 609 (1936).
35. See W. LAFAVE & A. Sco7r, supra note 7, at 185.
36. Hollinbeck v. Downey, 261 Minn. 481, 113 N.W.2d 9 (1962).
37. W. LAFAVE & A. ScoTT, supra note 7, at 186.
38. Cornell v. State, 159 Fla. 687, 32 So. 2d 610 (1947).
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Fifth, courts have imposed certain duties to warn or rescue on
landowners.3 9 For example, landowners must look out for the
safety of their business visitors.'0 Furthermore, a landowner may
have a duty to warn an innocent trespasser if the landowner
knows that the trespasser is in danger while on the premises.41
Finally, a duty to aid others in certain circumstances may be
specifically imposed by statute. For example, hit and run stat-
utes require drivers to stop and render aid after an accident,
42
even, in some jurisdictions, if the driver was not at fault.4' In
addition, a few states have statutes requiring people to assist po-
lice or firefighters when called upon to do so.
44
II. REASONS FOR ENACTING A DUTY TO NOTIFY
The enactment of a duty to notify would serve several pur-
poses.' 5 Most importantly, a duty to notify would help to deter
the harm that results from Bad Samaritanism. In addition, the
statute would function as a formal declaration of society's disap-
proval of Bad Samaritanism. Finally, enacting a duty to notify
may help to stimulate good samaritan behavior that goes beyond
the requirements of the statute.
A. Deterrent Effect
A duty-to-notify statute would reduce the harm resulting from
Bad Samaritanism in at least three ways. First, it would directly
mitigate the harm to victims of violent crimes and serious acci-
39. See W. PROSSER, supra note 5, at 351-415.
40. See, e.g., Johnston v. De La Guerra Properties, 28 Cal. 2d 394, 170 P.2d 5 (1946).
41. See, e.g., Martin v. Jones, 122 Utah 597, 253 P.2d 359 (1953).
42. See W. LAFAVE & A. SCOTT, supra note 7, at 184-85.
43. See W. PROSSER, supra note 5, at 343.
44. See Frankel, supra note 14, at 402 n.106.
45. Retribution is one reason for enacting a duty to notify that this Note does not
discuss, but that deserves mention. Insofar as retribution constitutes a valid reason to
punish wrongdoers, enacting a criminal duty to notify would have the additional benefit
of punishing bad samaritans for their callous omissions. Such a consideration seems most
compelling in a case like the New Bedford rape. See supra note 4. One is inclined to
think that the persons who cheered the rapists on deserve some sort of punishment,
whether or not such punishment effects any other desirable ends. For a brief discussion
of retribution as a theory of punishment, see H. PACKER, THE LIMrS OF THE CRIMINAL
SANCTION 37-39 (1968). For more detailed discussions see M. GOLDING, PHILOSOPHY OF
LAW 84-105 (1975); J. HALL, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LAW 296-309 (1960); R.
NozICK, PHILOSOPHICAL EXPLANATIONS 363-97 (1981).
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dents. In many cases, a timely phone call to the police would
save the victim. The stabbings in the Genovese murder, for ex-
ample, occurred over a period of thirty-five minutes, but the po-
lice arrived only two minutes after they were called.4 It is quite
likely that if someone had called the police after the first of the
attacks, Ms. Genovese would have survived. In the New Bedford
case, in which the attack went on for more than an hour, an
early phone call would no doubt have prevented much of the
victim's trauma.47 And in several of the other cases referred to
earlier, prompt notification of the police would probably have
prevented the tragedy. 48 A duty-to-notify statute, then, by com-
pelling people to notify the police immediately when they wit-
ness others in very dangerous situations, should prevent some of
the harm that would otherwise result.
49
Even in those situations in which notice to the police is not
timely enough to prevent harm to the victim, the duty-to-notify
statute would have a preventative impact insofar as it increases
the likelihood that an attacker will be caught and prevented
from committing future crimes. If the statute compels people to
notify the police more quickly and more frequently than they
otherwise would in the case of violent assaults, then presumably
the odds of catching the attackers will increase.
Finally, the duty to notify would probably have a general de-
terrent effect as well. If the odds of a violent attacker's being
caught are increased because there is an increased likelihood
that the police will be notified of the attack if it is witnessed,
then there should be a corresponding drop in violent crimes in
46. See supra note 3.
47. See supra note 4.
48. See supra notes 2 and 5. The Pinckney murder case provides a good example of a
death that could probably have been prevented through prompt notification of the po-
lice. Dining did not die for some time after he was originally beaten and stuffed in his
trunk, as evidenced by the fact that he continued to plead for mercy when his attackers
stopped twice later on to beat him further. If one of the witnesses had called the police
when Dining was first beaten and put in his trunk, he may well have survived.
49. Often, of course, merely notifying a police agency may be less efficacious than a
rescue attempt. If a witness sees someone drowning, for example, a phone call to the
police might not elicit help quickly enough to save the person's life. Nonetheless, a notice
requirement has certain advantages over a rescue requirement-above and beyond those
discussed in the rest of this Note-that tend to offset this loss in efficiency. First, requir-
ing people to notify rather than attempt a rescue lowers the risk that the victim will be
further harmed through a negligent rescue attempt by a non-professional. Second, the
notice requirement lowers the risk of injury to the would-be rescuer. Rescues can often
be dangerous, see U.S. N.ws & WORLD REP., Nov. 14, 1983, at 56, so it is safer to have
police and medical professionals perform them. Thus, the duty-to-notify statute may, all
things considered, prove nearly as efficient in preventing overall harm as a duty-to-res-
cue statute.
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cases in which the attacker perceives a risk of being detected. 0
In other words, criminals would be less inclined to commit vio-
lent assaults in the presence of witnesses if they knew that the
witnesses were legally obligated to call the police. 51
To produce these three deterrent effects, the duty-to-notify
statute would, of course, have to compel people to notify the po-
lice more frequently than they otherwise would. Given certain
basic principles of criminology, there are several ways in which
the duty-to-notify statute should be able to accomplish this ob-
jective. First and foremost is a criminal law's ability to coerce
people to obey through fear of punishment.52 By increasing the
cost to witnesses of not notifying the police, the statute should
increase notification.53
Second, the statute would eliminate any uncertainty people
might have about whether they are expected to notify the police
when they witness someone in grave peril. Doubts about societal
expectations can sometimes prevent people from doing some-
thing they would normally be inclined to do.54 Thus, some peo-
ple who might otherwise call the police when they witness some-
one in serious danger refrain from doing so because they are
afraid their actions will be considered "meddling."55 The duty-
to-notify statute would eliminate this uncertainty by letting peo-
ple know that their failure to notify is a criminal offense.
Finally, the statute would probably influence people simply by
virtue of its being the law. For some people, the statute's influ-
ence would derive from their belief that they ought to be law-
abiding, regardless of the sanction or likelihood of being
caught.56 For others, a change in the law would help to change
their attitudes: people who once viewed Bad Samaritanism with
indifference may begin to find it morally unacceptable when it is
prohibited by law.
57
50. See Friedman, Commonsense on Deterrence, reprinted in J. KAPLAN & J. SKOL-
NICK, CRIMINAL JUSTICE 54-58 (3d ed. 1982).
51. See J. WILSON, THINKING ABOUT CRIME 196-97 (1977).
52. See S. GLUECK, CRIME AND CORRECTION 78-79 (1952).
53. See J. DARLEY AND B. LATANE, THE UNRESPONSIVE BYSTANDER: WHY DOESN'T HE
HELP? 27-28 (1970) (stressing the importance of individual cost/benefit calculations in
forming people's decisions about whether or not to get involved in an emergency situa-
tion); Note, Duty to Rescue in Tort Law: Implication of Research on Altruism, 55 IND.
L.J. 551, 556-58 (1980).
54. See Hornstein, The Influence of Social Models on Helping, in ALTRUISM AND
HELPING BEHAVIOR 29-31 (J. Macaulay and L. Berkowitz eds. 1970).
55. See Note, supra note 53, at 556-57.
56. See C. ANDRAIN, POLITICAL LIFE AND SOCIAL CHANGE 23-24 (2d ed. 1974).
57. See infra notes 63-64 and accompanying text.
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B. Statement of Disapproval
In addition to its preventative value, the duty to notify would
serve the important function of formally declaring society's dis-
approval of Bad Samaritanism.58 It would let bad samaritans
know that our society does not condone such harmful behavior.
This may be important not only as a symbolic declaration, but
also for its impact on people's attitudes toward the law as a
whole. 59 As Professor Honor6 notes, it is one of "those indubita-
ble and unprovable commonplaces which are the very meat of
jurisprudence that people's attitudes to particular laws often de-
pend on their reverence for the law as a whole. If so, the failure
of the law to reflect and reinforce moral duties undermines
other, quite distinct laws." 60 Given the moral outrage that peo-
ple often harbor toward bad samaritans,61 the failure of the law
to prohibit Bad Samaritanism may have an adverse impact on
people's respect for the legal system generally.2
58. As sociologist Joseph Gusfield has observed: "Laws are statements of public pol-
icy and opinion as well as instruments for courts to implement and police to enforce. The
very passage of a law is an act of public definition of what is moral or immoral." Gus-
field, Social Sources of Levites and Samaritans, in THE GOOD SAMARITAN AND THE LAW,
supra note 6, at 196.
59. See Honor6, supra note 8, at 239-40.
60. Id.
61. Even those who claim that legal sanctions against Bad Samaritanism are unjusti-
fied usually grant the appropriateness of moral outrage. See, e.g., Henderson, Process
Constraints in Torts, 67 CORNELL L. REV. 901, 942-43 (1982). See also Buch v. Amory
Mfg. Co., 69 N.H. 257, 260, 44 A. 809, 810 (1898)(judge grants that defendant may be a
"moral monster" but holds that he is nevertheless under no legal obligation to render
aid).
62. One commentator has argued that a formal societal condemnation of Bad
Samaritanism is undesirable insofar as it levies an unfair moral censure against
those-such as overly timid people-who cannot conform their conduct to the require-
ments of the law. See Note, The Duty to Rescue, 47 IND. L.J. 321, 324-25 (1972). This
argument, however, confuses the notion of condemning a certain type of behavior, on the
one hand, and condemning an individual, on the other. The law may condemn certain
behavior, such as murder, without necessarily condemning or blaming a particular indi-
vidual who engages in it. The individual may have a legitimate excuse, such as insanity,
that negates both the individual's responsibility for, and the law's condemnation of, the
individual's behavior. It would be foolish, though, to argue that the law should not label
as blameworthy a type of behavior that is harmful because some individuals who violate
the law cannot be held responsible for their actions. The law serves an important func-
tion in condemning harmful behavior such as killing and Bad Samaritanism, even if in
exceptional circumstances courts decide not to condemn individual killers or bad
samaritans.
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C. Increased Altruism
Imposing a duty to notify may also inspire people to do altru-
istic acts that go beyond the minimal requirements of the duty.
Legal scholars have often said that the law not only reflects peo-
ple's values, but also helps to shape them.63 If this is so, then it
is likely that a legal prohibition against Bad Samaritanism could
help change people's attitudes about "getting involved."
At least one empirical study supports this position." In this
experiment a large number of subjects were asked to fill out a
questionnaire that polled their moral judgments on a number of
hypothetical factual situations involving various degrees of Bad
Samaritanism. After some of the hypotheticals the subjects were
told that the bad samaritan's behavior was illegal; after others
they were told that the behavior was not illegal. The experi-
ment's result was that significantly more people thought- a bad
samaritan's behavior was immoral when they thought it was ille-
gal than when they thought it was legally permissible.6 5 This
finding indicates that people's attitudes about a particular type
of behavior are shaped by what they perceive to be the law's
response to that behavior.
If this is true, then imposing a duty to notify should lead peo-
ple to an increased awareness of the harmfulness of Bad
Samaritanism and to a greater appreciation of its moral unac-
ceptability. Increased moral censure of Bad Samaritanism, in
turn, may inspire people toward greater altruistic behavior, 6
and it may also help to bring about a heightened sense of com-
munity among individual members of society.
III. POSSIBLE OBJECTIONS TO THE DUTY TO NOTIFY
Legal commentators have raised several objections to the en-
actment of a duty to rescue that one might also raise against the
enactment of a duty to notify. Some of these objections are pri-
marily theoretical: they assert that there is something funda-
mentally illegitimate about enacting positive duties of this sort.
63. See, e.g., D'Amato, supra note 8, at 809; Frankel, supra note 14, at 400.
64. Kaufman, Legality and Harmfulness of a Bystander's Failure to Intervene as
Determinants of Moral Judgement, in ALTRUISM AND HELPING BEHAVIOR, supra note 54,
at 77.
65. Id. at 80.
66. See H. BLOCH & G. GELs, MAN, CRIME, AND SocIETY 36-39 (1970) (discussing the
role of social values in shaping people's behavior).
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Other objections are more practical in nature. They assert that
even if the duty to rescue is a good idea in principle, in practice
it would be undesirable and ineffective.
Because objections such as these will probably constitute the
main bar to the adoption of a duty to notify, they merit and
receive extensive consideration in this Note. Although some of
these objections have merit against the duty to rescue, none has
much force against the duty to notify. Thus, none of these objec-
tions is of sufficient import to outweigh the benefits of a duty to
notify, and none constitutes a good reason not to adopt the duty
to notify that this Note proposes.
A. Theoretical Objections
Four major theoretical arguments have been raised in the legal
literature against the duty to rescue. One asserts that omissions
cannot give rise to liability because they do not cause harm. An-
other asserts that all non-contractual positive duties the state
imposes are illegitimate. A third asserts that the duty to rescue
is a type of forced altruism and that forced altruism is wrong.
And the fourth holds that the duty to rescue imposes an undue
burden on individual liberty. Although the last of these argu-
ments has some force against the duty to rescue, none of the
arguments presents a problem for the duty to notify.
1. The Causal Argument- The Causal Argument against
the enactment of a duty to rescue consists of two claims.6 7 The
first is that a failure to rescue cannot be the cause of harm be-
cause it is merely an omission. The second is that it is unfair
and inconsistent with the American legal system to punish peo-
ple for harm they do not cause. 8 A proper analysis of the first
element is beyond the scope of this Note: the causal status of
omissions is a difficult question and one that has aroused much
controversy. 9 It is not necessary to address this question, how-
67. See J. FEINBERG, supra note 1, at 165-85; Husak, Omissions, Causation, and Lia-
bility, 30 PHIL. Q. 318 (1980).
68. For examples of the Causal Argument, see Mack, Bad Samaritanism and the
Causation of Harm, 9 PHIL. AND PUB. AFFS. 230 (1980); Weinryb, Omissions and Respon-
sibility, 30 PHIL. Q. 1 (1980). See also Epstein, A Theory of Strict Liability, 2 J.LEG.
STUD. 151, 194-95 (1973) (employing a version of the Causal Argument to justify the no-
duty-to-rescue rule in tort law).
69. For arguments against the view that omissions cause harm, see Weinryb, supra
note 68; Mack, supra note 68. For arguments in support of the view that omissions can
be causes of harm, see H.L.A. HART & A. HONOIA, CAUSATION IN THE LAW 24-47, 58-64
(1959); J. FEINBERG, supra note 1, at 165-85. See also Kleinig, supra note 8, at 391-98
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ever, if the second element of the Causal Argument can be dis-
credited. The remainder of this section attempts to do so, argu-
ing that in fact this second element is either false or irrelevant,
depending on how it is construed.
If the second element of the Causal Argument is construed to
mean that the American legal system does not impose liability
on anyone who has not caused harm, then it is false. Perpetra-
tors of inchoate crimes, such as criminal attempts and conspira-
cies, are liable in the absence of harm. 0 So, for example, are
those who fail to perform certain state-imposed positive duties,
such as the duty to pay one's income taxes or the duty to report
for service when drafted by the military.71 If, on the other hand,
the second element of the Causal Argument is construed to
mean that it is unfair to punish people for causing harm they
did not in fact cause, then it may well be true, but it is irrele-
vant to the duty to notify. For the failure to prevent harm can
easily be conceptualized as an offense distinct from the offense
of causing harm. 2
Indeed, if certain omissions do not constitute causes of harm,
then they not only can, but must, it seems, constitute an inde-
pendent basis for liability.73 Consider, for example, a case in
(arguing that omissions are "causal factors"). For an excellent analysis of causation gen-
erally, as well as its specific application to the law, see H.L.A. HART & A. HONORAf, supra,
at 1-122.
70. See W. LAFAVE & A. ScoTT, supra note 7, at 423-95.
71. See infra notes 81-82 and accompanying text.
72. See Husak, supra note 67. To argue that failure to prevent harm could hot con-
stitute an independent ground for liability, the proponent of the Causal Argument would
either have to argue that causation is a necessary condition for liability or offer some
other general principle according to which liability for falling to prevent harm is illegiti-
mate. But the claim that causation is a necessary condition for liability is contradicted
by the law governing inchoate crimes, by state-imposed positive duties, by laws against
drunk driving, etc. See supra notes 70-71 and accompanying text. And it is difficult to
imagine any other plausible principle of liability that would preclude imposing liability
for failure to prevent harm. See infra note 73.
73. Consider in general the exceptions to the no-duty-to-rescue rule discussed in Part
I, supra notes 29-44 and accompanying text. If these cases are correctly decided, they
either belie the claim that omissions cannot cause harm, or they demonstrate that al-
lowing harm can itself be an independent source of liability. The causal question loses its
importance because liability is imposed in these cases regardless of the causal status of
the omissions.. See Note, Beyond Good Samaritans and Moral Monsters: An Individu-
alistic Justification of the General Legal Duty to Rescue, 31 UCLA L. REV. 252, 267-69
(1984).
Of course, to refute the Causal Argument, one need not argue that falling to prevent
harm must constitute an independent source of liability if omissions do not cause harm;
it is enough that it legitimately can. This then puts the burden of proof on the opponent
of the duty to notify to both offer some reason why it is wrong to impose liability for
merely failing to prevent harm, and to explain why at the same time it is permissible to
impose liability for failing to prevent harm in the babysitter case and the other cases
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which a babysitter fails to warn children that it is not safe to
play with the blender, and as a result, their fingers are cut off.
Would a judge absolve the babysitter of all responsibility for the
harm if one could demonstrate conclusively that the babysitter's
omission could not properly be said to have caused the harm?
That certainly seems unlikely. Rather, a court confronted with
such a demonstration would probably hold that the babysitter's
omission was itself actionable, even if it was not a cause of the
harm, because the babysitter had by virtue of his employment a
duty to try to prevent harm to the children, as well as a duty not
to harm them. The law does not, in such a case, punish the ba-
bysitter for causing harm he did not in fact cause; rather, it pun-
ishes the babysitter for allowing harm he should have prevented.
Causation may have a bearing on the degree of responsibility
involved in such cases, but it does not constitute a necessary
condition for liability.7 4 Thus, the Causal Argument fails, re-
gardless of the causal status of omissions, because there is no
reason why omissions like failing to notify cannot themselves
constitute grounds for liability, whether or not they constitute
that constitute the exceptions to the no-duty-to-rescue rule. See supra notes 29-44 and
accompanying text.
Professor Weinryb attempts to provide such an explanation through an appeal to what
he calls the "uniqueness requirement" of responsibility ascriptions. According to this
principle, the "idea of responsibility requires that it should be uniquely ascribed."
Weinryb, supra note 68, at 9. A causal connection is one way to meet this uniqueness
requirement, Weinryb claims. But it can also be established in certain contexts through
"voluntary obligations," such as promises, and through what he calls "role
responsibility."
The liability which is imposed in the cases that constitute exceptions to the no-duty-
to-rescue rule, he claims, results from voluntary obligation or from role responsibility. In
the latter, the defendant assumes a certain role by virtue of a special relationship he has
with the victim. This role brings with it particular duties that do not arise in ordinary
cases of Bad Samaritanism in which there are no special relationships between the par-
ties. Thus, Weinryb argues, liability is properly imposed in the exceptions to the no-
duty-to-rescue rule because they, unlike instances of Bad Samaritanism generally, satisfy
the uniqueness requirement.
Although Weinryb's explanation is consistent, it is not very compelling. He offers no
arguments in support of his claim that responsibility must be uniquely ascribed, and the
claim itself seems incorrect. The law does, in many instances, hold numerous people lia-
ble for the same tort or crime. Indeed, it is difficult to imagine how the law could possi-
bly ascribe responsibility uniquely for offenses such as conspiracy. Justifying liability in
terms of role responsibility, moreover, begs the question. It is not very enlightening to
explain that a parent has a duty to rescue her drowning child but a stranger does not
because the role of a parent carries with it certain affirmative duties and the role of a
stranger does not. That merely restates the rule: a parent has a duty to rescue her child,
but a stranger does not. To justify the rule, Weinryb would have to explain why the law
should treat the roles of the parent and the stranger differently.
74. See Woozley, supra note 8, at 1288-89.
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distinct grounds from actually causing harm.7 5
2. The Libertarian Argument- .The duty to notify might be
challenged on Libertarian grounds as a politically illegitimate
positive duty.76 According to Libertarianism, the only political
obligations people have are to keep their contractual obligations
and to avoid harming other people; consequently, a government
that requires more than this from its citizens violates their
rights." Thus, it may be argued, it is illegitimate for the state to
impose a general duty to notify, because people have not con-
tracted to notify, and they do not harm others by failing to no-
tify, but merely fail to help them.
One can make several responses to the Libertarian Argument.
First, Libertarianism's plausibility as a viable theory of political
obligation is certainly open to question. Although an adequate
critique of the theory is beyond the scope of this Note, it should
at-least be noted that most political philosophers find Libertari-
anism's view of political obligation impoverished.78  This, of
75. Professor Jerome Hall puts the point this way:
[I]f a husband sees his wife standing in the way of an oncoming train, or a father
sees his infant immersed in the bathtub and, being able to do so, he fails to act,
no one doubts his penal liability on the ground that the train, in the one case,
the water in the other, caused the death. . . . This indicates that physical causa-
tion alone does not determine liability. There must be something else, and in
criminal omissions, that element is illegal inaction, one might say, wrongly al-
lowing the forces of physical causation to operate when one, bound by law, could
have altered one of the consequences.
J. HALL, supra note 45, at 195-96.
Even if one rejects the Causal Argument, however, one might still claim that punishing
omissions violates the criminal law's actus reus requirement insofar as an omission is not
an act. The rationale behind the actus reus requirement, however, is not to restrict the
criminal law to positive acts, but to prohibit punishment for a mere harmful disposition
or a culpable mental state. See W. LAFAVE & A. SCOTT, supra note 7, at 175. Failing to
pay one's taxes, failing to comply with a military draft, and failing to carry one's license
when driving are examples of omissions that the criminal law prohibits. These make it
clear that the concept of actus reus includes omissions as well as positive acts. Or as
Professor Williams puts it: "It is therefore less misleading to say that a crime requires
some external state of affairs that can be characterized as criminal." G. WILLIAMS, TEXT-
BOOK OF CRIMINAL LAW 31 (1980).
76. For a general discussion of the Libertarian position, see R. NoZICK, ANARCHY,
STATE AND UTOPIA ix, 28-35, 149-53, 235-38, 256-74 (1974); Hospers, What Libertarian-
ism Is, in THE LIBERTARIAN ALTERNATwE (Machan ed. 1974).
77. R. NozicK, supra note 76, at ix; Hospers, supra note 76, at 12-13.
78. Even within the Liberal tradition, the Libertarian position on positive duties is
opposed by both of the main currents of political theory: Utilitarianism, on the one
hand, and the mainstream of contemporary Kantianism, or rights-theory, on the other.
For discussion of the Utilitarian position on positive duties see, e.g., J. BENTHAM, PRINCI-
PLES OF MORALS AND LEGISLATION, chs. 1, 17, § 19 (1789); R. BRANDT, ETHICAL THEORY
413-22 (1959). For discussion of the mainstream rights-theory position on positive duties
see, e.g., C. FRIED, RIGHT AND WRONG 110-19 (1978); I. KANT, THE METAPHYSICAL ELE-
MENTS OF JUSTICE § 49(c) (1797); J. RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 114-17 (1971).
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course, does not demonstrate that Libertarianism is wrong, but
it should make one suspicious of Libertarianism as a basis for
criticizing a law.
Furthermore, even if one were to grant the Libertarian posi-
tion on political obligation, it would not necessarily follow that a
duty to -notify would be illegitimate. It might be possible to jus-
tify such a duty even within the narrow confines of Libertarian-
ism. Professor Feinberg, for example, has argued forcefully that
a failure to rescue or notify can be a source of harm to other
people.7 9 If this is true, then the state can legitimately impose a
duty to rescue or notify on people, even within a Libertarian
framework. A duty to notify may also be justifiable within the
Libertarian framework on quasi-contractual grounds.8 0 Accord-
ing to this view, the government is justified in imposing a duty
to notify on people because by doing so it also confers on them a
benefit, namely, increased protection in the event that they are
ever in serious danger.
From a practical and legal standpoint, the most important ob-
jection to Libertarianism is that it is not consistent with the
American legal system. Libertarianism may be of considerable
theoretical interest, but its practical import is not very signifi-
cant because the law does impose positive duties on people that
go beyond honoring contracts and avoiding harmful behavior.
For example, the law requires people to pay taxes to promote
the general welfare,8' and it often requires them to serve in the
military during times of war.8 2 The law compels people to render
assistance to others under the exceptions to the no-duty-to-res-
cue rule,8" and it imposes a duty upon entrepreneurs to keep
their business premises safe.8' Libertarians may object to such
duties, but they nevertheless remain firmly entrenched within
the American legal system.
3. The Forced Altruism Argument- Even people who do
79. See J. FEINBERG, supra note 1, at 130-48, 172-81.
80. The notion of quasi-contract, as applied to political theory, is basically equivalent
to Rawls's "principle of fairness." See J. RAWLS, supra note 78, at 108-14. The duty to
notify can be seen as creating, in effect, a cooperative scheme that benefits all, and that
therefore entitles the majority to demand cooperation from all. For a criticism of this
theory see R. NozICK, supra note 76, at 90-95. Cf. A. SIMMONS, MORAL PRINCIPLES AND
POLITICAL OBLIGATIONS 101-42 (1979)(criticizing Nozick's argument, but joining Nozick in
rejecting the principle of fairness).
81. 26 U.S.C. § 7203 (1982). See also Helvering v. Davis, 301 U.S. 619 (1937) (uphold-
ing the constitutionality of Congress's broad spending and taxing power).
82. See Arver v. United States, 245 U.S. 366 (1917) (upholding the constitutionality
of the draft).
83. See supra notes 29-44 and accompanying text.
84. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Welansky, 316 Mass. 383, 55 N.E.2d 902 (1944).
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not accept Libertarianism may object to the idea of a statute
that requires people to do something to aid others. One such ob-
jection is that a law that required people to perform altruistic
acts would vitiate the moral worth of those acts. 86 According to
this argument, an altruistic act has moral worth only if it is per-
formed without coercion. Thus, if the law required rescues, they
would cease to be morally valuable.86
This argument seems Kantian insofar as it stresses the impor-
tance of motivation in determining the moral worth of an ac-
tion, 7 and undoubtedly it has a certain intuitive plausibility.
For example, it seems reasonable to suppose that a person who
sends money to feed the poor out of charity is more virtuous
than a person who sends money to the poor because of a legal
obligation. Actually, though, the argument is flawed because it
confuses the idea of a legal obligation with the idea of coercion.88
Kant's point is that an action has moral worth only if the mo-
tivation behind it is respect for the moral law.89 If the action is
coerced through fear of legal or other sanction, or is done for
selfish ends, then it is not virtuous.90 But it does not follow from
the fact that an action is required by law that its performance is
coerced. Many people obey such laws voluntarily. They would do
what the law specified regardless of whether the law required
them to do so.91 For these people, good acts do not cease to be
85. See Epstein, supra note 68, at 200-01.
86. Id.
87. See Weinrib, supra note 8, at 266 n.73.
88. One might argue, however, that even when one takes motive into account, an
altruistic act required by law seems slightly less virtuous than an equivalent act not
required by law. For example, a person who gives money to the starving when not obli-
gated by law to do so may seem more virtuous than one who gives when required by law,
even though in both cases the donor gives out of a sense of love for his fellow man rather
than fear of legal sanction. Thus, one could argue that enacting positive legal duties
diminishes the overall amount of goodness or virtue in the world.
Even if one accepts this notion of increasing and decreasing the overall goodness or
virtue in the world, however, it does not follow that enacting positive duties would result
in a net reduction of goodness or virtue. For it is also plausible to view a person who sits
in a bar and allows a rape to take place as more blameworthy than a person who notifies
the police out of fear of legal sanction, even though both individuals act wholly from self
interest. Thus, if enacting positive duties decreases the amount of goodness in the world,
then apparently it also decreases the amount of moral evil in the world, because it pre-
vents people from omitting to do their duty. Doing one's duty for a selfish reason, in
other words, seems less blameworthy than failing to do one's duty at all. Thus, any de-
crease in goodness or virtue in the world resulting from the enactment of positive duties
would seem to be offset by a corresponding decrease in evil.
89. See I. KANT, FOUNDATIONS OF THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS § 1 (1785).
90. Id.
91. See E. JOHNSON, CRIME, CORRECTION & SocIETY 17-26 (1964) (emphasizing the im-
portant role extra-legal social norms play in influencing social behavior).
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good merely because they are required by law.
Indeed, if requiring a virtuous act by law vitiated its moral
worth, then it should follow that honesty in one's handling of
other's property would lack moral worth because of the exis-
tence of laws against larceny and conversion.92 By the same rea-
soning, one might advocate legalizing assault or murder so as to
maximize the moral value of the behavior of those who volun-
tarily refrain from maiming and killing. It seems strange, in
other words, to argue that a certain type of reprehensible behav-
ior should be legal because it would be better if people volun-
tarily refrained from such behavior. It might indeed be better
not to have criminal laws in a world in which everyone did as he
should without external coercion. But that world is not our
world, and in our world criminal sanctions are often a necessary
response to harmful behavior.93
Yet even those who do not accept the argument that forced
altruism vitiates the moral worth of altruistic acts might feel un-
92. See Woozley, supra note 8, at 1292-93.
93. Professor Epstein apparently anticipates this objection by arguing that the pres-
ervation of moral worth is not the only factor to be considered in determining the legiti-
macy of a law. He seems to advocate a balancing test between the need to preserve the
moral worth of voluntary acts by not hindering freedom, and the need to control harm to
others by restricting freedom. He views the no-duty-to-rescue rule as striking the proper
balance between these competing concerns. See Epstein, supra note 68, at 200-01.
The claim that criminal prohibitions diminish the moral worth of good acts is not very
plausible, though, unless one also holds that this loss in moral worth can be offset by a
corresponding lessening of moral evil brought about by the law's ability to deter immoral
acts and omissions. See supra note 88. Preserving the moral worth of actions, therefore,
is not a significant factor to be considered in determining the legitimacy of a law, and
there is thus no need to balance it against the desire to prevent harm.
Even if one were to grant Epstein's view regarding the moral worth of actions, how-
ever, together with his claim that the goal of preserving moral worth must be balanced
against the goal of preventing harm to society, it is not clear that the no-duty-to-rescue
rule would strike the proper balance between preventing harm and preserving moral
worth.
Epstein apparently thinks that striking the proper balance between these competing
interests would lead one to draw the line so as to distinguish "conduct which is required
and that which, so to speak, is beyond the call of duty," and that the no-duty-to-rescue
rule accomplishes this result. Epstein, supra note 68, at 201. He does not explain, how-
ever, why he thinks that a distinction drawn between acts required by duty and acts
beyond the call of duty would strike the best balance between preventing harm and pre-
serving moral worth. Nor, as Professor Feinberg argues, is it very plausible to say that
the distinction between positive duties and negative duties corresponds to the distinction
between actions required by duty and those beyond the call of duty. It seems wrong, for
example, to say that a person who lets a baby drown in one foot of water is not morally
blameworthy. Rescuing the baby is obligatory, it seems, not something above and beyond
the call of duty. See J. FEINBERG, supra note 1, at 149-50. Thus, even if one were to grant
Epstein's claim that a law requiring people to rescue would diminish the moral worth of
that action, it would be far from clear that such a duty would on that account prove
undesirable.
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easy about enacting a law that requires people to perform chari-
table or altruistic acts. Such uneasiness, however, is unfounded.
In the first place, imposing a duty to notify is really not
equivalent to forcing people to perform charitable acts. The
duty to notify applies to all people equally. Instead of requiring
one class of people to benefit another without remuneration, it
makes all of us donors in the event we witness another in serious
danger, and allows all of us to be recipients if we are ever in
serious danger.9 4 Thus, the duty-to-notify statute should not
prove problematic even for those who believe that it is wrong for
government to compel charitable acts.
Furthermore, our system of government already imposes legal
requirements that come much closer to the idea of forced charity
than does the duty to notify. When the state taxes people to
redistribute wealth through welfare payments,e5 for example, or
when it uses tax money to send famine relief to a foreign coun-
try,96 it is requiring people to contribute to the well-being of
others without receiving anything in return. Thus, even if the
duty to notify were a type of legally enforced charity, it would
not be inconsistent with the American legal system.
4. The Individual Liberty Argument- A further argument
against the duty to rescue is that it would impose an undue bur-
den on individual liberty. 7 This argument raises an important
consideration, but its force against the duty to notify is quite
limited.
The argument seems plausible because, other things being
equal, certain positive duties impose a greater restriction on peo-
ple's freedom than negative duties.98 This greater burden exists
because one may have to perform a positive duty such as the
duty to rescue without warning; thus, it can take people by sur-
prise. If people witness someone in serious danger, they must
drop what they are doing and try to assist the person. A negative
duty, on the other hand, such as a law prohibiting theft, is some-
thing people can plan their lives around because they always
know what they can and cannot do.
94. Here an analogy with taxing people to provide police protection seems apt. Im-
posing a duty to notify is one way the state can provide protection to its citizens. In
effect, the statute "deputizes" an individual to assist the police when that person wit-
nesses someone in serious danger.
95. See, e.g., 7 U.S.C. § 2011 (1982)(authorizing food stamp benefits to low-income
citizens).
96. See 7 U.S.C. §§ 1721, 1728 (1982) (authorizing emergency relief aid to famine
victims).
97. See Frankel, supra note 14, at 424; Epstein, supra note 68, at 198.
98. See J. FEINBRG, supra note 1, at 163-65.
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That a particular law imposes a positive rather than a nega-
tive duty, however, is certainly not the only or most important
factor to be considered in determining how great a burden it im-
poses on individual liberty. A negative duty may be very bur-
densome, and a particular positive duty may hardly be burden-
some at all. The main factor is how contrary to the individual's
lifestyle the duty is, not whether it is positive or negative. A law
prohibiting homosexual acts among consenting adults, for exam-
ple, may prove to be much more burdensome for some people
than a law requiring people to carry their driver's licenses with
them when they drive. Thus, one cannot necessarily conclude
that a law imposes an undue restriction on individual liberty
merely because it imposes a positive duty.
In the case of a duty to rescue, one might reasonably argue
that the cost imposed by the duty-having to get personally in-
volved in a rescue attempt-outweighs the benefits of the law.
But a similar argument against the duty to notify is not very
plausible, for the duty's impact on individual liberty is quite
minimal. The Model Statute this Note proposes simply requires
people to notify a police agency if they witness someone in seri-
ous danger.9 9 The average person is likely to encounter such a
situation only rarely, and some people may go their entire lives
without such a duty arising. Furthermore, the statute does not
ask all that much of people; it requires only that they make a
.reasonable effort to notify a police agency if the duty arises. 100
Given the great harm that can result from Bad Samaritanism,' 0
this seems a small price to pay.
B. Practical Objections
Legal commentators have raised several arguments designed
to show that the duty to rescue would be impracticable. One
claims that it would be impossible to draw a line between the
duty to rescue and other positive duties of which most people
would not approve. Another asserts that the duty to rescue
would be "non-verifiable," and therefore undesirable. A third ar-
gument claims that the duty to rescue would be unenforceable.
And a fourth asserts that the duty to rescue would encourage
criminals to feign injury in order to lure would-be rescuers into
99. See infra Part IV, Model Statute.
100. Id.
101. See supra notes 2-5 and accompanying text.
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traps. These four objections are somewhat plausible with regard
to the duty to rescue. They do not, however, raise significant
problems for the duty to notify.
1. The Line-Drawing Argument- Some commentators have
claimed that even if the duty to rescue is a good idea in theory,
its enactment might not be because of the difficulty of drawing a
line between this duty and more extensive infringements on in-
dividual liberty that are undesirable.102 The problem, as some
commentators see it, is that duties requiring actions such as res-
cue, which society may approve of, cannot be distinguished from
duties that society would probably not want to impose on peo-
ple, such as a duty to give money on demand to starving
beggars.103
It is difficult to see, however, why one would think that enact-
ment of a duty to rescue or notify would lead to more intrusive
duties. Proponents of this argument may feel that it is impossi-
ble to formulate a clear, bright-line rule that would distinguish
the duty to rescue from more intrusive duties, but such a fear is
unfounded. Although some proposed duty-to-rescue statutes
may suffer from open-endedness,1 0 4 it is by no means an intrac-
table problem. The Minnesota duty-to-rescue statute, for exam-
ple, limits the duty to cases in which the witness is "at the scene
of an emergency." 10 5 This precludes the possibility of extending
the duty to require people to give money to a beggar.
Duty-to-notify statutes, moreover, are even less likely than
duty-to-rescue statutes to contain expansive language. It is very
difficult to imagine how a statute requiring notice could be inter-
preted to require someone to give money to a beggar, or to re-
quire a doctor to travel to another country to operate on a sick
102. See, e.g., T. MACAULAY, Notes on the Indian Penal Code, in 17 COMPLETE
WORKS 318-20 (1898); Epstein, supra note 68, at 198-99; Hale, supra note 21, at 215.
103. Professor Epstein puts the argument like this:
Once one decides that as a matter of statutory or common law duty, an individ-
ual is required under some circumstances to act at his own cost for the exclusive
benefit of another, then it is very hard to set out in a principled manner the
limits of social interference with individual liberty. . . .Even if the rule starts
out with modest ambitions, it is difficult to confine it to those limits. Take a
simple case first. X as a representative of a private charity asks you for $10 in
order to save the life of some starving child in a country ravaged by war. There
are other donors available but the number of needy children exceeds that num-
ber. The money means nothing to you. Are you under an obligation to give the
$10?
Epstein, supra note 68, at 198-99.
104. See, e.g., the Model Statute proposed by Rudolph, supra note 8, at 499-509.
105. MINN. STAT. ANN § 604.05 (1984).
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person, or to require any other such duty.' Imprecision, there-
fore, should pose no real problem for a carefully drafted duty-to-
notify statute.
Perhaps, though, the Line-Drawing Argument is directed to-
ward the threat of judicial activism. People may fear that "lib-
eral" judges will extend the duty to rescue beyond the intent of
the legislature to include actions such as giving money to beg-
gars, in the same way that the federal courts have apparently
extended such protections as civil rights107 and the right to pri-
vacy ' °1 beyond the original intent of the framers. This fear is
also unfounded, however, because it ignores a crucial difference
between constitutional interpretation and statutory interpreta-
tion. The former can be overridden only after a constitutional
convention or a two-thirds vote of Congress, together with the
approval of three-quarters of the states.109 A statute that re-
ceives an undesirable interpretation, on the other hand, can gen-
erally be altered by a simple majority vote of the legislature." 0 If
a legislature that passes a duty-to-notify statute dislikes the in-
terpretation it gets from the courts, it can always change the
statute to correct the problem. Thus, judicial interpretation
poses no more of a line-drawing problem than legislative
drafting."'
106. These examples are mentioned by Macaulay, supra note 102, at 314-15.
107. See, e.g., Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964).
108. See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
109. U.S. CoNsT. art. V.
110. 81A C.J.S. States § 52 (1977); Delaware ex. rel. Morford v. Emerson, 40 Del.
328, 340, 10 A.2d 515, 520 (1939).
111. Advocates of the Line-Drawing Argument may also have in mind a more theo-
retical objection to the duty to rescue. They may think that there is no principled differ-
ence, only a difference in degree, between requiring people to rescue and requiring them
to give money to beggars, -and that any line drawn between the two is therefore arbitrary
and unjustified.
If this is the argument, however, then it is not very persuasive. It simply does not
follow from the fact that two concepts differ only as to degree that the concepts are not
meaningfully distinct, or that a distinction made on the basis of such concepts is unjusti-
fied. The concepts "black" and "white" are clearly and meaningfully distinct, notwith-
standing the fact that there are no clear zones of discontinuity in the gray area between
them where one could hope to draw a bright line. Differences in degree can be very
important, and even if the difference between requiring people to rescue and requiring
them to give money to beggars is merely one of degree, it certainly does not follow that a
legal line drawn between the two is unjustified or arbitrary in an invidious way. Society
may, for example, think that non-burdensome positive duties are legitimate, while bur-
densome ones are not. Such line-drawing is common in the law, and necessary if one is
going to strike an equitable balance between competing considerations.
Consider, for example, the use of force in self-defense. Whether such force is legitimate
or not depends on whether it is "reasonable." See W. LAFAvE & A. Scorr, supra note 7,
at 391-97. Although the difference between reasonable force and unreasonable force is
one of degree, it does not follow that the concepts of reasonable force and unreasonable
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2. The Non-Verifiability Argument- One commentator' 1 2
has raised a related argument against the duty to rescue that
concerns the inability of individuals to know in a given situation
whether the statute requires them to act or not. He refers to this
inability as the problem of "non-verifiability."' s The difficulty,
according to this commentator, is that in many cases would-be
rescuers cannot determine whether acting or refraining from act-
ing is more likely to expose others to risks of harm. The result-
ing uncertainty is unfair to those upon whom the duty is im-
posed, and it encourages unwanted meddling in the affairs of
others. For example, a person who witnesses a young couple
struggling in the back seat of an automobile "may not be sure
whether he is watching a rough and tumble courtship or an im-
minent rape. A call to the police may be either helpful or trau-
matic in its effect, depending on the circumstances."' 1 4 The situ-
ation is different with other laws, according to this view, because
the person in doubt may always err on the side of safety. But
with the duty to rescue, an error on either side may cause harm.
Although this objection may have some validity against cer-
tain duty-to-rescue statutes, due to the fact that mistaken "res-
cues" have the potential for infringing on people's personal lives,
it has little force against the duty-to-notify statute this Note
proposes. First, the duty to notify arises only when the witness
knows or has reason to know that someone is in grave physical
peril." 5 Thus, a truly ambiguous situation like the "rape" case
would not trigger the duty. Furthermore, the duty is limited to
notifying the police and does not compel people to become per-
sonally involved in such situations; thus it reduces the possibil-
ity of unwanted meddling.
The non-verifiability problem is not, moreover, unique to posi-
tive duties such as the duty to notify. On the contrary, it arises
in a number of legal contexts. People defending themselves from
attack, for example, are faced with a similar dilemma: whether
to use only moderate force and risk further attack, or to defend
themselves vehemently and risk exceeding the bounds of "rea-
sonable force," thereby committing an assault of their own."'
force are not meaningfully distinct, or that the distinction based on them-assault versus
legitimate self-defense-is unjustified.
112. See Henderson, supra note 61, at 932-35.
113. Id. at 932. Henderson views verifiability as one of several "process constraints"
that have shaped the common law rules governing tort liability.
114. Id. at 934 n.163.
115. See infra Part IV.
116. See W. LAVE & A. ScoTT, supra note 7, at 391-97.
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Nor is it true with the duty to notify that the person deciding
whether or not to notify the police cannot err on the side of
safety. The person who believes, but is not sure, that an individ-
ual is in grave peril should play it safe and notify the police. In
very few legitimate situations are law-abiding people in a public
place harmed by someone's notifying the police about what they
are doing. In the "rape" case, for example, it is clear that the
risk of harm is much greater if the witness refrains from calling
the police than if she calls the police and leaves it up to them to
determine whether or not the situation is worth investigating.
Surely the harm resulting from a rape is greater than the harm
likely to result from a police officer's temporarily interrupting
the passion of a pubescent pair who are probably breaking the
law by making love in public anyway.
117
Thus, the individual who is unsure whether to notify or not
should err on the side of safety and call the police. Rather than
being a drawback, this safety factor should prove to be an asset.
It will encourage people to notify the police in situations in
which they do not actually know that the victim is in serious
danger, but believe it to be probable nonetheless. In such situa-
tions, it is preferable that the police be aware of the danger and
make their own assessment of the situation, within the con-
straints of the fourth amendment,1 than to risk allowing seri-
ous harm. Hence, the supposed problem of "non-verifiability"
may be more of a benefit than a burden.
3. The Enforceability Argument- At least one commenta-
tor has argued that a duty to rescue would prove unenforce-
able;11 9 a similar objection might also be raised against the duty
to notify. The main thrust of this objection is that the police
cannot identify all those who may witness a serious accident or
violent attack and then fail to report it.
Although some people who violate the duty-to-notify statute
would undoubtedly escape detection, the statute's effectiveness
does not depend on the police's ability to catch all, or even most,
of the offenders. If the risk of getting caught represents a sub-
stantial threat, most people would probably conform to the easy
requirements of the statute rather than risk criminal sanction.
1 2 0
People react in this way to many other criminal laws. Although
most people who actually violate these laws are not apprehended
117. See Model Penal Code, § 251.1 (1962).
118. See, e.g., Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968) (before investigating, officer must have
reasonable belief that criminal activity may be afoot).
119. See Note, supra note 62, at 327.
120. See supra notes 50, 52.
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on any given instance, 21 the threat that they will be is enough to
keep many people from breaking the law.
Furthermore, the law's ability to stimulate compliance with its
dictates is not limited solely to coercion through threat of pun-
ishment. It is likely that some people who might not otherwise
assist someone in peril would obey a duty-to-notify statute sim-
ply because it is the law, and others would do so because of the
law's role as a moral teacher and guide. 12 2 Thus, many people
would obey the law, even if the risk of getting caught violating it
is slim.
Finally, enforcement of the duty to notify would probably not
prove as difficult as it might at first seem. The European duty-
to-rescue statutes have apparently not encountered serious en-
forcement problems, 23 and there is no reason to believe the
duty-to-notify statute presented here would be any more diffi-
cult to enforce. In many cases of Bad Samaritanism, the identity
of the witnesses is not in doubt. 2  And even when the identity
of the witnesses is more difficult to determine, the police should
be able to identify some of the witnesses by questioning people
known to be in the vicinity of the crime or accident, such as
neighbors. 2  Thus, although enforcement of the duty-to-notify
121. In the case of crimes such as burglary, car theft, carrying a concealed weapon,
etc., the majority of violations are either undetected or unsolved. See H. BLOCH & G.
GELS, supra note 66, at 123-26. See also M. PHILLIPSON, UNDERSTANDING CRIME AND DE-
LINQUENCY 102 (1974); J. WILSON, supra note 51, at 224.
122. See supra notes 54-57 and accompanying text.
123. See Franklin, Vermont Requires Rescue: A Comment, 25 STAN. L. REV. 51, 60
(1972).
124. Consider the cases of Bad Samaritanism discussed earlier in this Note, supra
notes 2-4 and accompanying text. In almost half of these cases, there was apparently no
problem identifying witnesses.
125. A problem that could arguably arise from the duty to notify is a possible chilling
effect it might have on getting certain witnesses to talk. Someone who witnesses a serious
crime but does not notify the police may, when later questioned by the police, deny
being a witness for fear of being convicted under the duty-to-notify statute. Although
this is a legitimate concern, there are several reasons why it should not present a signifi-
cant problem. (I am indebted to Michael Gilliland for bringing this problem to my
attention.)
First, the chilling effect generally applies only to people witnessing crimes. In the case
of accidents and injuries there is usually not the same need for witnesses to testify. So
far as crimes are concerned, the main way to avoid the chilling effect is to offer immunity
to those witnesses suspected of witholding information because they fear being prose-
cuted under the duty to notify. Of course, offering immunity raises problems of its own;
in particular, it can greatly weaken the statute's ability to deter Bad Samaritanism. If
the prosecution grants people immunity when they violate the statute, it seems, then
there will not be any incentive for them to comply with it.
In fact, however, this fear is exaggerated. Even if the prosecution granted everyone
immunity, the statute would still serve a preventative purpose. The granting of immu-
nity basically affects only the law's ability to coerce people into compliance, and as noted
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statute might not be easy, it would not be so difficult as to viti-
ate the benefits of the statute. Police are professionals at law
enforcement, and the duty to notify would probably present less
of an enforcement challenge than many existing laws.
4. The Faker Argument- A further problem with the duty
to rescue is that criminals may feign serious injury to lure
would-be rescuers into a trap in order to rob them.1 2 6 Such inci-
dents do occur from time to time," and a duty-to-rescue statute
seems to encourage such criminal behavior by. making it easier
for those feigning injury to entice would-be rescuers into their
traps.
The duty-to-notify statute, however, avoids this problem. It
does not require a witness to risk injury or attack by assisting a
victim personally. It only requires witnesses to call the police.
Thus, the duty to notify does not compel people to do something
that might appear safe, but may in fact be dangerous. The duty-
to-notify statute may even discourage such ploys, for if wit-
nesses, in accordance with the statute, summon the police when
they see someone who appears to be injured, they alert the po-
lice to the trap should the "victim" turn out to be faking.
earlier, there are other ways in which the statute would stimulate compliance, and other
reasons for having such a statute. See supra notes 53-66 and accompanying text.
Furthermore, it probably would not be necessary to grant immunity to all or even most
of the witnesses in most criminal cases because the police would generally not need to
question everyone who witnessed the attack to make a case. Those who are not needed as
witnesses could still be prosecuted. Because a witness to a violent crime would not gener-
ally know whether the police would need his testimony, he would risk prosecution by
failing to notify. It would also be possible to grant partial immunity to those who cooper-
ate, thereby eliminating the chilling effect while preserving the statute's ability to levy
sanctions against violators. Thus, the prosecution's ability to grant immunity to certain
witnesses in order to obtain information should not significantly detract from the stat-
ute's ability to compel people to notify.
In fact, in certain cases the duty to notify may actually enhance the ability of police to
obtain information. The chilling effect presents a problem only with regard to those wit-
nesses who would otherwise testify, except that they fear prosecution under the duty-to-
notify statute. Others who would fail to notify, however, would probably refuse to testify
after the fact as well, whether or not there was a duty to notify. By offering these recalci-
trant witnesses partial or full immunity from the duty to notify, the police could offer
them an incentive to testify that would otherwise be lacking.
126. See D'Amato, supra note 8, at 811 n.47.
127. For example, in Detroit, a young college student stopped to help a man who was
lying on a sidewalk, apparently injured. When the student approached the man, the man
suddenly sat up, pointed a gun at the student, and demanded his money. After taking
his wallet, the man told the student to lie on the ground, and then shot him dead. De-
troit Free Press, Aug. 24, 1984, at A3.
Duty to Render Aid
IV. A MODEL STATUTE
This section proposes a model statute that legislatures could
use as a guide in drafting duty-to-notify statutes. The comments
that follow the statute explain its various provisions.
DUTY TO NOTIFY
SEC. 1. Any person who knows or has reason to
know that another person is in serious physical dan-
ger, and who witnesses this person's predicament,
shall notify a police agency of the danger as soon as
reasonably possible, unless:
(a) the person witnessing the predicament knows
that a police agency has already been notified; or
(b) the person witnessing the predicament is unable
to notify a police agency with a reasonable effort; or
(c) the endangered person appears able to notify a
police agency without outside help.
SEC. 2. A violation of Section 1 is a misdemeanor
punishable by a fine of not more than $500, imprison-
ment for a term not to exceed 30 days, or both.
SEC. 3. Proof of a violation of this statute does not
constitute grounds for imposing civil liability on per-
sons who violate the statute.
28
Comments
This statute imposes a general criminal duty to notify on
those who witness another in serious physical danger. It contains
128. The purpose of Section 3 is, of course, to prevent this criminal statute from
being used as a tool for enacting civil liability through the doctrine of negligence per se.
See W. PROSSER, supra note 5, at 190-204. This Note does not argue against the enact-
ment of civil liability for Bad Samaritanism, but merely suspends judgment in light of
the more complicated problems such liability involves. In particular, certain problems
involved in allocating responsibility for the harm which results from Bad Samaritanism
require further study. For arguments against enacting civil liability by authors who are
in favor of criminal liability, see D'Amato, supra note 8, at 801-04; Benditt, supra note 8,
at 409-48.
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certain qualifications, however, that are necessary to prevent it
from being overly inclusive.
A. Serious Physical Danger
The statute limits the duty to notify to situations in which the
victim is in "serious physical danger." This means that a witness
need not notify the police unless the victim is suffering serious
bodily harm, or there is a substantial possibility that the victim
will suffer such harm in the immediate future. The duty thus
extends only to serious cases. It applies, for example, when the
victim is being beaten, shot, stabbed, or raped, or when there is
a substantial possibility that such an assault will result if help is
not called. It applies also when someone has been seriously in-
jured in an accident or has suffered a heart attack.
The duty to notify does not apply when the harm is trivial or
the risk of harm slight, or when the harm is wholly mental or
spiritual. A witness is not required to give notice, therefore, of a
car accident in which no one is hurt, or of a minor physical in-
jury such as a broken finger, or if she believes that someone's
soul is in peril. Limiting the duty in this way keeps it from being
excessively burdensome to the witness and ensures that it does
not encourage people to meddle in the affairs of others when
their help is not required.
B. Knows or Has Reason to Know
The duty to notify is also limited to situations in which the
witness knows or has reason to know that the victim is in serious
physical danger. This limitation prevents the statute from ap-
plying the duty to people who witness an ambiguous situation
which, though it in fact involves a victim in serious physical
danger, is not clear enough to lead a reasonable person in the
witness's position to know that the victim is in such danger.
129
For purposes of this statute, having "reason to know" of the
danger means being presented with clear and convincing evi-
dence that someone is in serious physical danger.
One might argue that the statute is still overly inclusive be-
cause the objective standard of knowledge it employs would al-
low punishment of someone too stupid or unreasonable to realize
129. See supra notes 112-18 and accompanying text.
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that he is witnessing someone in serious physical danger. It is
not fair to apply a reasonable person test in the criminal law,
-one might claim, because punishment is legitimate only if the
defendant's subjective mental state is culpable.13
This criticism has merit, but it raises a dilemma that is not
unique to the duty to notify. The choice between a subjective
standard and an objective standard often confronts the drafter
of a criminal statute,181 and to a large extent requires a tradeoff
between considerations of fairness on the one hand and the need
to conserve scarce judicial resources on the other. Looking to the
defendant's subjective mental state lessens the possibility that
someone could be convicted for being unreasonable rather than
callous, but it also generally requires more extensive litigation to
determine what that mental state was. This type of extensive
litigation is probably necessary for serious crimes, because the
punishment is severe, but it is not practical for minor offenses,
for which the punishment is not severe, and for which the prose-
cution cannot afford to spend a great deal of time on the case.
132
In these less serious cases it seems preferable to rely on judicial
discretion to reduce the possibility of unfair application. This
Note chooses the objective standard, therefore, because the rela-
tively light penalty the statute imposes does not merit the ex-
tensive litigation often required to determine a defendant's sub-
jective mental state. If a legislature believed it important to
employ a subjective standard, however, it could easily do so
without otherwise affecting the statute.
C. Witnesses the Peril
The Model Statute requires that the defendant must have
witnessed the danger in order to be prosecuted under the duty
to notify. It is not enough that someone merely know of the dan-
ger; the person must also see the victim's plight, or witness it in
some other sensory manner, such as hearing the victim cry for
help. The purpose of this requirement is to prevent the duty
130. In effect, the Model Statute presented here requires a mens rea of negligence:
the witness must have had reason to know of the victim's peril and have failed nonethe-
less to notify. For a general discussion of negligence as mens rea, see W. LAFAVE & A.
ScoTT, supra note 7, at 208-18; H. HART, PUNISHMENT AND REsPoNsiIn.rrv 136-57 (1968).
131. For example, the objective standard is often employed for certain types of driv-
ing offenses and for negligent homocide. See W. LAFAVE & A. ScoTT, supra note 7, at 108.
132. See G. WILLIAMS, supra note 75, at 46-48; W. LAFAVE & A. Sco'rr, supra note 7,
at 216-17.
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from extending to people who have only indirect evidence that
someone is in danger.
D. Police Already Notified
A person does not have to notify the police under the duty-to-
notify statute presented here if that person knows that a police
department or another suitable authority has already been noti-
fied. A passerby who witnesses a serious car accident, for exam-
ple, need not provide notice if an ambulance is already on the
scene. This limitation avoids needless repetition of notice.
E. Reasonable Effort
The Model Statute requires only that the witness make a rea-
sonable effort to notify, and it excuses those who witness some-
one in serious physical danger but cannot notify the police with-
out extraordinary effort. This wording is, of course, flexible, and
courts will have to work out its exact parameters on a case-by-
case basis. Nevertheless, the Model Statute does not require one
to give notice if one is camping many miles from the nearest
phone or police station, nor does it require one to risk injury to
oneself to give notice. The statute is designed to prevent outra-
geous failures to notify, not to compel acts of heroism.
The reasonableness limitation applies also to the immediacy
with which notice must be given. Thus, an ambulance driver on
an emergency run can wait until she gets back to the hospital
before notifying police. Likewise, a witness who aids the victim
personally, believing that notification would be too late to help,
may wait until after the rescue to notify the police.13
133. Many states have passed "Good Samaritan Laws" that grant immunity from
tort liability to those who accidentally injure the victims of rescue attempts, unless such
injury was recklessly or intentionally inflicted. See Note, Good Samaritan Stat-
utes-Adrenalin for the "Good Samaritan," 13 DE PAUL L. REv. 297 (1964). Basically
this seems like a good idea insofar as it encourages people to get personally involved
without actually requiring them to do so. Whether states grant such immunity or not,
however, good-faith rescuers should not be punished for failing to give immediate notice
if the reason for the failure was that they were busy aiding victims. Good-faith rescuers
meet the statute's notice requirement, therefore, if they provide notice as soon as reason-
ably possible after the rescue attempt.
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Finally, the duty to notify does not apply if the person in dan-
ger appears to be able to summon help without assistance. This
limits the duty to cases in which the victim wants or would want
help, were he cognizant of the danger. Such wording is necessary
to ensure that the statute does not require people to meddle in
the affairs of others if their help is not desired. It also makes the
duty less burdensome to witnesses by eliminating the need for
them to help those who can help themselves.
CONCLUSION
The duty to notify may strike some people as a rather radical
idea because it is unfamiliar. This Note has attempted to dispel
such skepticism, however, by arguing that the law's apparent in-
difference toward Bad Samaritanism is supported by neither
reason nor sound policy. The model duty-to-notify statute
presented here requires very little of people, especially when
weighed against the benefits that should result from its enact-
ment. Considering that the duty raises no significant theoretical
or practical problems for the legal system, its enactment seems
desirable. This Note therefore urges legislatures to adopt the
duty to notify as a minimally burdensome tool for combating the
needless injury and loss of life that result from Bad
Samaritanism.
-Mark K. Osbeck
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